We provide a general framework allowing to define modal logics of various relations between models. Then we investigate the submodel relation and show that on the class of all models in any signature having a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2, its modal logic coincides with S4 if the signature contains no constant symbols, and with S4.2.1 otherwise.
Introduction
Consider a class C of models in a fixed signature Ω and a binary relation R on C. Natural instances of such an R between models A and B in C include "B is a submodel of A", "B is a homomorphic image of A", "B is an extension (for models of arithmetic or set theory: an end-extension, a generic extension) of A", "B is an existential closure of A", etc. The central idea of this article is to use modal propositional language for describing properties of (C, R) by interpreting modal formulas by sentences of a given modeltheoretic language L over the signature Ω in the following way:
If ϕ is a sentence in L, then so is ✸ϕ, and ✸ϕ is true at a model A in C ("ϕ is possible at A") iff ϕ is true at some model B in C related to A via R.
Then we investigate the modal theory of (C, R), i.e., the set of all valid in (C, R) modal formulas. This idea, mainly inspired by modal logic of forcing [7] , was suggested by the first author more than ten years ago. This paper provides general tools to handle modal theories of model-theoretic relations. In particular, we show that the modal theory of (C, R) is the modal logic of a certain general frame (C, R, V), thus is a normal modal logic.
The whole Section 2, devoted to modal logics of abstract model-theoretic relations, implies using of arbitrary such L, with no special restrictions.
In Section 3, where we study a particular case of the submodel relations, we concentrate on specific languages, namely, infinitary first-and secondorder ones. Recall that, for κ ≥ λ two infinite regular cardinals, the language L κ,λ expands L ω,ω by γ-ary conjunctions and disjunctions for any γ < κ, and δ-ary quantifiers for any δ < λ.
To simplify definitions, we consider usual (binary) conjunctions and disjunctions as a special case with γ = 2, usual (unary) quantifiers as a special case with δ = 1, and assume that (e.g.) conjunctions and existential quantifiers are basic while disjunctions and universal quantifiers are defined in an obvious way: α<γ ϕ α is ¬ α<γ ¬ ϕ α , and ∀ α<γ x α ϕ is ¬ ∃ α<γ x α ¬ ϕ.
Thus the class of formulas of L κ,λ is closed, besides usual constructions, under the following:
(i) if ϕ α are L κ,λ formulas for all α < γ, then so is α<γ ϕ α ,
(ii) if x β are variables for all β < δ and ϕ is a L κ,λ -formula, then so is ∃ β<δ x β ϕ.
Furthermore, for a given λ, the language L ∞,λ is the union of L κ,λ for all κ, and the language L ∞,∞ is the union of L ∞,λ for all λ. Note that these languages are proper classes.
All these languages are first-order, in the sense that they have only individual variables, i.e., valuated by elements of models. The interpretations of infinitary connectives and quantifiers are as expected: for any model A with the universe A, and any valuation c, . . . in A, The second-order infinitary languages L 2 κ,λ , L 2 ∞,λ , L 2 ∞,∞ additionally use second-order predicate and functional variables (of various arity) to construct terms and formulas:
(i) if X is an n-ary functional variable and t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are terms, then X(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) is a term,
(ii) if X is an n-ary predicate variable and t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are terms, then X(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) is an (atomic) formula, (iii) if X β are second-order (predicate or functional) variables for all β < δ and ϕ is a L 2 κ,λ -formula, then so is ∃ β<δ X β ϕ.
The satisfiability is defined as before, the only additional concern is the second-order quantification, which we consider with the full semantics, i.e., interpreting second-order variables by arbitrary relations and operations on the universe of the model:
We do not discuss these languages in any details and refer the reader to the corresponding parts of the book [1] and the bibliography there. We shall define and consider in details only a notion of relativization in these languages (in Subsection 3.1), which is difficult to find in the literature; this notion will be crucial for expressing the satisfiability in submodels, the core concept of the last part of our article.
Modal logic: basic facts
In the sequel, by a modal logic we shall mean a normal propositional unimodal logic (see e.g. [2] or [5] ). Namely, modal formulas MF are built from a countable set PV of propositional variables p, q, . . . , the Boolean connectives, and the modal connectives ✸, ✷. We can assume that ⊥, →, ✸ are basic, and others are abbreviations; in particular, ✷ abbreviates ¬ ✸ ¬ . We shall denote modal formulas by upright Greek letters ϕ, ψ, χ, . . . A set of modal formulas is called a normal modal logic if it contains all classical tautologies, two following modal axioms:
and is closed under three following rules of inference:
A general frame F is a triple (W, R, V), where W is a nonempty set, R ⊆ W × W , and V is a subalgebra of the powerset algebra P(W ) closed under R −1 (i.e., such that R −1 (A) = {x ∈ W : (∃y ∈ A) x R y} is in V whenever A is). By a Kripke frame (W, R) we mean (W, R, P(W )). We shall often use the term frame for a general frame (and never for a Kripke frame). The modal algebra associated with a frame (W, R, V) is (V, R −1 ); as Jónsson and Tarski shown [11] , any modal algebra (i.e., a Boolean algebra endowed with a unary operation that distributes w.r.t. finite Boolean unions) can be represented by a modal algebra associated with a general frame.
A model M on a frame F = (W, R, V) is a pair (F, θ), where θ : PV → V is a valuation. The truth relation M, x ϕ ("ϕ is true at x in M") is defined in the standard way (see e.g. [5] ); in particular, M, x ✸ϕ iff M, y ϕ for some y with xRy. A formula ϕ is true in a model M if it is true at every x in M, and is valid in a frame F = (W, R, V) iff it is true in every model on F. The set MLog(F) of all valid in F formulas is called the (modal) logic of the frame F. The following fact is well-known, see e.g. [2] or [5] . Theorem 1. A set of formulas is a consistent normal logic iff it is the logic of a general frame.
For a logic L and a formula ϕ, let L + ϕ be the least logic containing L ∪ {ϕ}.
The least logic containing the formulas ✸✸p → ✸p and p → ✸p is denoted by S4. We put S4.2 = ✸✷p → ✷✸p and S4.2.1 = S4.2+✷✸p → ✸✷p. The following fact is well-known (see e.g. [5] ).
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be a modal formula.
1. ϕ ∈ S4 iff ϕ is valid in every preorder (i.e., transitive and reflexive Kripke frame).
2. ϕ ∈ S4.2 iff ϕ is valid in every preorder satisfying
3. ϕ ∈ S4.2.1 iff ϕ is valid in every preorder satisfying
The three items remain true if we replace "every" with "every finite".
A ∈ V}, and y ∈ W ′ whenever x R y for some x ∈ W ′ . The following fact is standard (see e.g. [5, Section 8.5] ). Proposition 3.
2. Let {F i : i ∈ I} be a family of generated subframes of a frame F such that every x in F belongs to F i for some i ∈ I. Then MLog(F) = i∈I MLog(F i ).
Modal logic: quotient frames
If ∼ is an equivalence on W , let W ∼ be the quotient W/∼. For a binary relation R on W , we define a relation R ∼ on W ∼ by letting, for all equivalence classes A, B ∈ W ∼ ,
Consider V ⊆ P(W ). Define also another relation R V ∼ on W ∼ by letting, for all equivalence classes A, B ∈ W ∼ ,
Finally, define an equivalence relation ∼ V on W by letting, for all x, y ∈ W ,
For equivalences ∼ 1 and ∼ 2 , we say that
Lemma 4. Let (W, R, V) be a general frame and ∼ an equivalence relation
Proof. Let A R ∼ B. Suppose B ⊆ V ∈ V and show A ⊆ R −1 (V ). Thus pick any x ∈ A and show x ∈ R −1 (V ). For some x 0 ∈ A and y 0 ∈ B we have x 0 Ry 0 . So x ∼ x 0 , and hence
is a general frame) and x 0 ∈ R −1 (V ) (by y 0 ∈ B and x 0 Ry 0 ), whence we get x ∈ R −1 (V ), as required.
Let (W, R, V) be a general frame. Put
Thus V ∼ ⊆ P(W ∼ ), and elements of V ∼ are quotient sets A/∼ for A ∈ W ∼ V .
is a modal algebra isomorphic to (V, R −1 ). In particular, the following three algebras are isomorphic:
To prove the converse inclusion, suppose A ∈ R −1 (V ∼ ). Thus A R B for some B ∈ V ∼ . Since R ⊆ R V ∼ and B ⊆ V , we have A ⊆ R −1 (V ). The latter means that A ∈ (R −1 (V )) ∼ . The proof is complete.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.
is called the refinement of the frame (W, R, V) (cf. [5, Chapter 8] ).
Proof. Immediate from the definition of validity in a general frame.
Metatheory
Our metatheory is ZFC, the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice. Thus, in particular, our model-theoretic languages and all their syntactic and semantic constructions (including formulas, models, satisfiability relations, etc.), also our modal logics and their syntax and semantics, and moreover, interrelations between model theory and modal logic under our considerations, -are understood as sets, or classes of sets, in ZFC.
To simplify reading, as a rule we denote the syntax of our object languages differently: we use inclined letters if they are related to model theory (x, y, . . . for individual variables, ϕ, ψ, . . . for formulas), and upright letters if they are related to modal logic (p, q, . . . for propositional variables, ϕ, ψ, . . . for formulas). As for the syntax of our metalanguage, when possible, we make its notation distinct from the notation of our object languages (⇔, &, . . . for logical connectives, Φ, Ψ, . . . for formulas), but generally, the difference between our metalanguage and object languages should be clear from the context.
Recall that ZFC deals with objects of only one type, called sets; when we speak about classes, we mean not real classes like those in NBG or KM set theories, but just formulas defining them; a notation like x ∈ C for a class C is a shorthand for a certain formula Φ, thus the intended meaning is C = {x : Φ(x)}. In particular, so are large languages like L ∞,ω , classes of models and relations on them, and other proper classes we constantly use in sequel.
Some perplexity may be caused by the fact that often we speak not only about classes but even about objects of higher types, like classes of classes, etc. There is no real problem with this, however: we still mean formulas, only with a larger set of parameters. Let us clarify this by examples.
In Section 2 we consider a class C of models A in a given signature Ω and an equivalence ∼ on it (e.g. the isomorphism equivalence), thus actually, some ZFC-formulas, say Φ and Υ , meaning C = {x : Φ(x)} and ∼ = {(x, y) : Υ (x, y)}. We also consider the quotient class C/∼, which looks at the first glance as the superclass consisting of ∼-equivalence classes [x] ∼ . In fact, however, what we understand by C/∼ in our setting is rather a usual class defined by a ZFC-formula, namely:
Thus it is just the equivalence ∼ restricted to the class C. Note that once an x satisfying Φ(x) is fixed, the formula Υ (x, y) defines its equivalence class [x] ∼ . This is why we can use the class instead of the usual quotient.
Another example is provided by the algebra V of classes V ϕ = {A ∈ C : A ϕ} consisting of models A in Ω which belong to C and satisfy a sentence ϕ of a model-theoretic language L(Ω). Again, V is considered not as a superclass but rather as a usual class defined by a formula. Let C = {x : Φ(x)}, L s (Ω) = {y : Ψ (y)} (the class of sentences in L(Ω)), and once a y satisfying Ψ (y) is fixed, let
Then what we understand by V in our setting is the following class:
Thus the formula defining our V in fact defines V ϕ but parametrized by ϕ.
These examples illustrate our general principle: instead of real superclasses, hyperclasses, etc., we deal just with usual classes (i.e., in fact, ZFCformulas) but parameterized by appropriate extra arguments.
This approach allows to generalize the modal logic concepts and facts from Subsections 1.2 and 1.3 to the situation in which frames are proper classes; this is exactly the situation under our subsequent investigation. A possible alternative approach is using the Reflection Theorem (in our metatheory ZFC; see e.g. [10, Theorem 12.14]) to replace the set-theoretic universe with a set sufficiently large to reflect the model-theoretic properties under our consideration.
Modal theories of models 2.1 Modal theories of translations
by induction on the length of modal formulas:
Clearly, θ t distributes w.r.t. all Boolean connectives.
Given a set of sentences T ⊆ L s (Ω) and a translation t in L(Ω), the modal theory of (T, t) is the set
To simplify the notation, whenever L and Ω are fixed, we shall write just
Example 1. Let L be the usual first-order finitary language L ω,ω . 1. Let Ω be the signature of arithmetic (i.e., Ω = {0, +, · }) and let t(ϕ) express the consistency of ϕ for all sentences ϕ in Ω. By well-known Solovay's results [14] , if T is the Peano arithmetic PA, then MTh(T, t) is the Gödel-Löb logic GL, and if T is the true arithmetic TA (i.e., the set of all sentences that are true in the standard model of arithmetic) then MTh(T, t) is the (quasi-normal but not normal) Solovay logic S.
2. Let Ω be the signature of set theory (i.e., Ω = {∈}) and let t(ϕ) express that the sentence ϕ holds in a generic extension. By Hamkins and Löwe [8] , if T is ZFC then MTh(T, t) is S4.2. This modal logic of forcing was introduced by Hamkins in [7] . A survey of further results can be found in [3] .
In our work, we are mainly interested in the case when T is the theory of some class of models of a fixed signature Ω, called also structures in Ω or Ω-structures. For model theory, we refer the reader to the standard textbook [6] .
Let C be a class of Ω-structures and t a translation. We shall say that a modal formula ϕ is t-valid in C and write (C, t) ϕ iff for every valuation θ in L(Ω) we have C θ t (ϕ), i.e., A θ t (ϕ) for all A ∈ C. The modal theory of (C, t) is the set of all modal formulas that are t-valid in C:
Again, simplifying the notation, whenever L and Ω are fixed, we write MTh(C, t) instead of MTh L(Ω) (C, t). An easy observation shows that logics of theories and of classes of models are mutually interchangeable concepts:
2. If T is a set of sentences of L(Ω) that contains all of its own semantic consequences, then
Proof. Immediate from definitions. Proof. Clearly, MTh(C, t) contains all tautologies and is closed under Modus Ponens. It remains to check that it is closed under Substitution.
For any p ∈ PV, ψ ∈ MF, and a valuation θ, we define an auxiliary valuation θ ′ by letting, for all q ∈ PV,
Then for every ϕ(p) ∈ MF we have θ t (ϕ(ψ)) = θ ′ t (ϕ(p)). The proof of this fact is by induction on the length of ϕ; e.g.:
where the second equality holds by induction hypothesis.
It follows that if ϕ(p) is t-valid in C, then ϕ(ψ) is t-valid in C too. Thus MTh(C, t) is closed under Substitution, as required.
Notice that MTh(C, t) is not necessarily closed under Monotonicity, as the instance of the Solovay logic S shows. Let us also mention Buss' logic of pure provability introduced in [4] ; this logic is not closed under Substitution. In the next section we shall define the notion of modal theory of a model-theoretic relation, the central notion of our paper, and show that such systems are normal modal logics.
Remark. Translations allows us to "hybridize" our modal and modeltheoretic languages by using expressions like C ✸ϕ to mean C t(ϕ), for ϕ ∈ L s (Ω). Such a mixed language is systematically used in papers on modal logic of forcing [3] , [7] , [8] .
Modal theories of model-theoretic relations
In provability logic and logic of forcing, modalities are expressible in arithmetic and set theory, respectively. It is essential to have this expressibility feature for model-theoretic constructions under our studying.
Let Ω be a signature, C a class of Ω-structures, and R a binary relation on C (or, possibly, on a larger class C ′ ⊇ C). A translation t in a language L(Ω) expresses the satisfiability in R-images on C, shortly, expresses the R-satisfiability, iff for every sentence ϕ ∈ L s (Ω) and model A ∈ C,
The R-satisfiability is expressible in L(Ω) iff some translation expresses it. Some examples of such expressibility and non-expressibility will be given below. Essentially, the expressibility of the R-satisfiability is the expressibility of the corresponding modal operator.
The following proposition observes that the modal theory of C with a translation expressing the R-satisfiability on C is in fact independent of a particular way of choosing such a translation.
Proposition 10. Let C be a class of Ω-structures and R a binary relation on C. If translations t and s in L(Ω) both express the R-satisfiability, then
Proof. Let us show that for every model A ∈ C, valuation θ, and formula ϕ ∈ MF, we have
We argue by induction on the construction of ϕ. The induction basis and the case of Boolean connectives are obvious. For the case of the modal connective ✸, suppose A θ t (✸ϕ). Then A t(θ t (ϕ)), so we have B θ t (ϕ) for some B ∈ C with ARB. By induction hypothesis, B θ s (ϕ). Hence A s(θ s (ϕ)), i.e., A θ s (✸ϕ), as required.
This fact allows to reduce translations expressing satisfiability in images of a relation between models to the relation itself:
Definition (Main definition: the modal theory of a model-theoretic relation). If the R-satisfiability is expressible in L(Ω) on a class C of Ω-models, define
as MTh L(Ω) (C, t), where t expresses it, and call it the modal theory of
Again, whenever L and Ω are fixed, we write MTh(C, R) instead of MTh L(Ω) (C, R).
General frames of models
Given a signature Ω, a class C of Ω-structures, and a language L, we put
, and
To simplify the notation, whenever L, Ω, C, all are fixed, we shall write just V ϕ instead of V ϕ, C and V instead of V L(Ω), C . (Recall that the classes C, V ϕ , and V are shorthands for formulas, as explained in Section 1.4.) Theorem 11. Let the R-satisfiability on C be expressible in L(Ω). Then (C, R, V) is a general frame and
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of the above definitions. Indeed, suppose that for valuations θ : PV → L s (Ω) and η : PV → V, and for all propositional variables p ∈ PV and models A ∈ C,
where t expresses R. Then for all formulas ϕ ∈ MF and models A ∈ C we have
This fact is proven by induction on the construction of ϕ. E.g.,
Then (2) holds, and by (3) we have the inclusion MLog(C, R, V) ⊆ MTh(C, R).
Conversely, given η : PV → V, for p ∈ PV put θ(p) = ϕ where η(p) = V ϕ . Again, (2) holds, and by (3) we obtain MTh(C, R) ⊆ MLog(C, R, V), thus completing the proof.
Corollary 12 (Soundness theorem for normal logics). If the R-satisfiability on C is expressible in L(Ω), then MTh(C, R) is a normal modal logic.
Quotient frames of models
Fix a signature Ω, a class C of Ω-structures, and a binary relation R on C.
Let ≃ denote the isomorphism equivalence, thus A ≃ B means that there is an isomorphism of models A and B. Given a language L, let us say that A and B (in a signature Ω) are L(Ω)-equivalent iff A ϕ ⇔ B ϕ holds for all sentences ϕ ∈ L s (Ω). Let ≡ L(Ω) denote the L(Ω)-equivalence. Note that the equivalence relation ≡ L(Ω) is coarser than the equivalence relation ≃ (by basic assumptions on languages L under our consideration).
To simplify notation, whenever L, Ω are fixed and no ambiguity may arise, we shall write ≡ instead of ≡ L(Ω) .
Following our previous conventions, we write C ≃ and C ≡ instead of C/≃ and C/≡, respectively, and define two relations, R ≃ on C ≃ and R ≡ on C ≡ , by letting for all A, B in C,
Finally, we let for all ϕ ∈ L s (Ω), As before, whenever L, Ω, C are fixed, we shall write just
, respectively. We shall keep the full notation, however, in the cases when we consider different parameters, as e.g. in Proposition 15 and the subsequent discussion on robust theories.
Keeping in mind that V denotes V L(Ω), C , we define R V ≡ on C ≡ by letting, for all A, B ∈ C,
In other words, if a translation t expresses the R-satisfiability on C, then
Also define R V ≃ on C ≃ in the same way but replacing ≡ by ≃ . Note the following facts. For our algebra V, the L(Ω)-equivalence ≡ is just ∼ V in sense of Section 1.3. By Lemma 4,
, and (C ≃ , R V ≃ , V ≃ ) are general frames; in particular, (C ≡ , R V ≡ , V ≡ ) is the refinement of (C, R, V). Hence, we are able to apply Proposition 6 to conclude that the modal logics of these quotients all coincide with the modal logic of the frame (C, R, V).
We use these facts to describe the modal theory of (C, R) (in L(Ω)) as the modal logic of the quotient frames.
Proof. By Theorem 11, the modal theory MTh(C, R) coincides with the modal logic MLog(C, R, V). Now the statement follows from Proposition 6.
Remark. If fact, Proposition 5 allows to obtain, moreover, MTh(C, R) = MLog(C ∼ , R ∼ , V ∼ ) for any equivalence relation ∼ finer than ≡, and also for all relations R between R ∼ and R V ∼ . The following proposition provides a simple sufficient condition for the coincidence of the modal theory of (C, R) with the modal logic of a Kripke frame.
Proposition 14. Let the R-satisfiability be expressible in
Proof. If C ≡ is finite, then all its subsets are definable in L(Ω), thus V ≡ = P(C ≡ ).
Robust modal theories
In the following, we consider distinct languages and compare the resulting modal theories; hence we temporarily return to the full notation with superscripts like MTh L(Ω) .
Proposition 15. Let L and K be two languages, and let the R-satisfiability be expressible in both L(Ω) and
Proof. This follows from Theorem 11 and Proposition 7.
The properties of (C, R) captured by its modal theory MTh L(Ω) (C, R) depend on the particular language L. One can think that L describes the properties of (C, R) in a robust way whenever the modal theory does not change under strengthening the language.
Thus, assuming that the R-satisfiability is expressible in L(Ω) on C, we shall say that MTh L(Ω) (C, R) is robust iff for every language K ⊇ L such that the R-satisfiability is expressible in K(Ω) on C too, we have the equality
In Section 3 we shall calculate modal theories of the submodel relation and show that these theories are robust.
Logics of submodels
In this part, we apply our general approach to calculate the modal theory of the submodel relation on the classes of all models in a given signature. We consider languages with equality. Given models A and B in a signature Ω, let A ⊒ B mean "A contains B as a submodel".
Expressing the satisfiability in submodels
As the initial step, we must find a model-theoretic language strong enough to express the ⊒-satisfiability. Observe first that the first-order languages are generally too weak for this.
Theorem 16.
If Ω contains a binary predicate symbol, then the ⊒-satisfiability is not expressible in the first-order languages, even the infinitary language L ∞,ω (Ω) .
Proof. Toward a contradiction, assume that some translation t expresses the ⊒-satisfiability.
Let ϕ be an obvious L ω,ω (Ω)-sentence saying that there exists a ≤-minimal element (where ≤ is a binary predicate symbol in Ω), and let θ(p) = ϕ. Then θ t (✷p) = ¬ t(¬ ϕ) expresses the existence of a ≤-minimal element in each non-empty subset, i.e., the well-foundedness of ≤. The latter, however, is not expressible even in L ∞,ω (see e.g. [12] , p. 49, or [1] ).
We provide also an alternative example. Let ϕ be an obvious L ω,ω (Ω)-sentence saying that ≤ is a dense linear order, and let θ(p) be ϕ. Then θ t (✸p) expresses the existence of a dense subset, i.e., the non-scatteredness of ≤. This is also is not L ∞,ω -expressible.
For L ω,ω , an easy example is scattered Z and non-scattered Q · Z, which are elementarily equivalent, where Z and Q are the sets of integers and of rationals with their usual orderings, respectively, and X · Y is the lexicographic product of X and Y . For the whole L ∞,ω , the non-expressibility of the scatteredness follows from the non-expressibility of the well-orderedness (clearly following from one of the well-foundedness) and Lemma 17 below.
Lemma 17. Let Ω contain a binary predicate symbol ≤, and let L extend L ω 1 ,ω . If L(Ω) expresses the scatteredness then it expresses the wellorderedness.
Proof. Assume that ϕ is an L(Ω)-sentence which expresses the scatteredness, i.e., such that (X, ≤) ϕ ⇔ (X, ≤) is a scattered linearly ordered set.
For each n ∈ ω, let ψ n (x, y) be an L ω,ω -formula saying that y ≤ x and there are at most n elements between y and x, and let ψ <ω (x, y) be the formula n∈ω ψ n (x, y). Then ψ <ω (x, y) says that y ≤ x and there are at most finitely many elements between y and x. Note that it belongs to L ω 1 ,ω and hence, to L. Let now ψ be the following sentence:
Thus ψ says that for every x, if there is y ≤ x with at most finitely many elements between y and x, then there is the least of such y's. It follows that the sentence ϕ ∧ ψ is in L(Ω), and (X, ≤) ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ (X, ≤) is a well-ordered set, as required.
Remark. Theorem 16 can be refined in several directions.
1. On the one hand, the ⊒-satisfiability is non-expressible even for languages L ∞,λ with infinitary quantifiers. This can be stated e.g. by using an appropriate generalization of the well-foundedness and the scatteredness.
2. On the other hand, it is possible to prove that for signatures having only unary predicate symbols and, possibly, constant symbols (but neither predicate symbols of arity ≥ 2 nor functional symbols of arity ≥ 1), the ⊒-satisfiabilty is expressible in the first-order language L κ,ω where κ is the least infinite cardinal greater than the cardinality of the set of constant symbols. We shall consider the modal theories of the submodel relation on models in such signatures in our further papers, so here we do not discuss this matter in details. Now we shall show that second-order (in general, infinitary) languages suffices to express the ⊒-satisfiability. Before this, we define the relativization in second-order infinitary languages L 2 κ,λ and use it to show that the notion of a submodel is second-order expressible.
A second-order formula ϕ is atomic iff it is of form P (t, . . .) for a predicate constant P (including the predicate constant = for the equality relation), or X(t, . . .) for a predicate variable X and (second-order) terms t, . . . . Given a formula ϕ in L 2 κ,λ (Ω) and a unary (thus having a single first-order parameter) predicate variable symbol U that does not occur in ϕ, let ϕ U denote the relativization of ϕ to U , which we define by recursion on construction of ϕ:
The first conjunct in the right part of (v), respectively, (vi), says that each X α is an n-ary relation, respectively, an n-ary operation, on {a : U (a)} (with n depending on α). The relativization of other connectives and quantifiers easily follows.
Lemma 18. Let A be a model in a signature Ω having the universe A, and let B ⊑ A have the universe B ⊆ A. For any formula ϕ in L 2 κ,λ (Ω) and U a unary predicate variable symbol which does not occur in ϕ,
where c, . . . ∈ B and C, . . . ∈ P(B) interpret first-order and second-order variables of ϕ, respectively, and B interprets U .
Proof. By induction on construction of ϕ. The cases of atomic formulas, as well as of Boolean connectives, easily follow from the definitions of the relativization and the satisfaction of formulas in L 2 κ,λ (Ω); let us write up only the case of quantifiers. So assume we have already proved the claim for ϕ, and prove it for ∃ α<ξ x α ϕ and ∃ α<ξ X α ϕ. We have:
⇔ there exists a sequence (b α ) α<ξ in B such that
Similarly, for predicate variables X α , α < ξ,
⇔ there exists a sequence (B α ) α<ξ in P(B) such that
and likewise for functional variables.
Lemma 19. Let a signature Ω have < κ functional (including constants) symbols (and arbitrarily many predicate symbols). Then the notion of submodels is expressible in the language L 2 κ,ω (Ω) and hence, in any larger language.
Proof. For each functional symbol F in Ω, say, of arity n, and X a oneparameter predicate variable, let ψ F (X) be the formula
Clearly, ψ F (X) expresses that X is closed under F .
Let now ψ(X) be the following formula:
(∃x X(x)) ∧ {ψ F (X) : F ∈ Ω is a functional symbol}.
Then ψ(X) expresses that X forms a submodel (of any model satisfying the formula). Thus if B consists of the interpretation of X in A and the restrictions of the operations and relations interpreting Ω in A, then we have
as required.
Theorem 20. Let a signature Ω have < κ functional (including constant) symbols. Then the ⊒-satisfiability is expressible in the language L 2 κ,ω (Ω). Moreover, this holds for L 2 µ,ν (Ω) with any µ ≥ κ and ν ≥ ω.
Proof. Let us first emphasize that the expressibility of the ⊒-satisfiability (or another model-theoretic relation) in some language does not guarantee the same in larger languages since the latter has more formulas the satisfiability of which we need to express. In our case, however, the proof is same for all the languages that are larger than L 2 κ,ω and allows an appropriate notion of relativization, and goes as follows.
Fix µ ≥ κ and ν ≥ ω and consider the language L 2 µ,ν (Ω) (the relativization in which was defined above). For any ϕ in L 2 µ,ν (Ω) pick a fresh unary predicate variable X, and let ψ(X) be the formula expressing "X is a submodel" constructed in Lemma 19; then we define the formula χ ϕ as follows:
Clearly, χ ϕ also belongs to L 2 µ,ν (Ω) and has the same parameters as ϕ does. Then it follows from Lemmas 18 and 19 that χ ϕ expresses the existence of a submodel satisfying ϕ. Thus if A is a model in Ω with the universe A, we have, for all c, . . . ∈ A and C, . . . ∈ P(A),
In particular, if Ω has only finitely many functional symbols, then the notions of submodels and of the ⊒-satisfiability are expressible in the usual (finitary) second-order language L 2 ω,ω . Remark. The proof of Theorem 20 establishes some facts stronger than we need for using in our setting.
1. We shall use the expressibility of the ⊒-satisfiability of formulas ϕ only in the case when ϕ are sentences, while Theorem 20 holds for arbitrary formulas.
2. The proof of the theorem establishes a uniform expressibility of the ⊒-satisfiability: the formulas χ ϕ form a schema when ϕ run all formulas of a given language.
3. As immediately seen from the proof, not only the full language L 2 µ,ν expresses the notions of submodels and the ⊒-satisfiability of its own formulas, but this remains true to its monadic fragment (which involves only unary predicate variable) as well as its existential fragment (which involves only existential second-order quantifiers), and to the intersection of the two fragments. Two previous items of this remarks applies to these fragments as well.
Henceforth we adopt the following convention:
If Ω has < κ functional symbols then L denotes L 2 µ,ν for some µ ≥ κ and ν ≥ ω.
Therefore, we assume that our languages L are appropriate for the considered signatures Ω to express the ⊒-satisfiability of their own formulas. If follows that whenever a class C of Ω-structures is closed under substructures, then the modal theory of (C, ⊒) in L(Ω) is defined and is a normal modal logic. Moreover, as we shall see, for signatures considered below, the resulting modal logic is robust and thus does not depend on choosing particular such µ and ν.
Logic of submodels: soundness
Our next results concern modal theories of the submodel relation.
For an Ω-structure A, let Sub(A) denote the set of all its substructures.
Lemma 21. If C is a class of Ω-structures closed under substructures, then
Proof. Follows from Theorem 11 and Proposition 3(2).
The next result is the soundness theorem.
Proof. Let A ∈ C. By Theorem 11, MTh L(Ω) (Sub(A), ⊒)) is the modal logic of a general frame of form (Sub(A), ⊒, V). The latter logic includes the logic of the Kripke frame (Sub(A), ⊒). Then we use Lemma 21 and Proposition 2.
Signatures with a functional symbol of arity at least two: completeness
Here we handle a particular case when signatures have at least one functional symbol of arity at least 2, and prove the completeness theorem by calculating explicitly the modal theories of the submodel relation in the classes of all models in such signatures. We shall see that there are exactly two such theories, S4 and S4.2.1, and the difference depends only on the absence or presence of constant symbols in the signature Let Q n be the lexicographic product of (n <n , ⊆) (an n-ramified tree of height n) and (n, n×n) (a cluster of size n). Thus for s, t ∈ n <n and i, j ∈ n, in Q n we have
so Q n is a pre-tree which is n-ramified, has height n and clusters of size n at each point. Let also Q ′ n be the ordered sum of Q n and a reflexive singleton, thus Q ′ n adds to Q n an extra top element. The following fact is standard (see e.g. [5, p. 563 
]).
Proposition 23. Let ϕ be a modal formula. If ϕ / ∈ S4, then ϕ is not valid in Q n for some n > 0. If ϕ / ∈ S4.2.1, then ϕ is not valid in Q ′ n for some n > 0.
Recall that ≡ abbreviates ≡ L(Ω) .
Theorem 24.
Let Ω have a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2. For every positive n < ω, there exists a model A n in Ω such that
Proof. First, suppose that Ω has no constant symbols. Without loss of generality we may assume that Ω has a binary functional symbol, which we shall denote by · .
Fix n ≥ 1. Let X n = n <n × ω. We define the model A n = (X n , · , . . . ) in Ω as follows. Let E be any injective map from n <n into ω. For s, t ∈ n <n and i, j ∈ ω, we put
where is the concatenation, |s| the length of s, mod the remainder, and ≡ n the congruence modulo n. For other operations F in A n we put F ((s, i) , . . .) = (s, i) and take the relations in A n to be empty.
For (s, i) ∈ X n let X n (s, i) = {(t, j) ∈ X n : (s, i) (t, j)}, where we let (s, i) (t, j) iff s ⊆ t and i ≤ j.
Lemma 25. An X ⊆ X n is the universe of a submodel of A n iff X = X n (s, i) for some (s, i) ∈ X n .
Proof. Straightforward from the definition of A n .
Let A n (s, i) be the submodel of A n with the universe X n (s, i).
Lemma 26. Let (s, i), (s, j) ∈ X n . If i ≡ n j, then the models A n (s, i) and A n (s, j) are isomorphic.
Proof. The map (t, l) → (t, l + n) is an isomorphism between A n (s, i) and A n (s, i + n).
Define p 0 (x) = x, p k+1 (x) = (p k (x)) · (p k (x)) for 0 < k < ω. Then A n (t, j) = p k (s, i) iff s = t and j = i + k.
For s ∈ n <n , let ϕ s (x) be the following one-parameter formula:
Lemma 27. Let A be a submodel of A n and (t, i) an element of A. Then A ϕ s (t, i) iff s = t and i ≡ n 0.
Proof. We have p(t, i) = (t, i + 1). By the definition, (t, i) · (t, i + 1) = (t, i + E(t) + 1) if i ≡ n 0, and (t, i) · (t, i + 1) = (t, i) otherwise.
Lemma 28. Let A be a submodel of A n . For s ∈ n <n , A ∃x ϕ s (x) iff (s, i) is in A for some i ∈ ω.
Proof. The 'only if' part is immediate from Lemma 27. For the 'if' part we use Lemmas 27 and 25.
For S ⊆ n <n , let χ S be the sentence s∈S ∃x ϕ s (x) ∧ s / ∈S ¬ ∃x ϕ s (x), and let χ ≥s be χ S for S = {t ∈ n <n : s ⊆ t}.
Lemma 29. Let A be a submodel of A n . Then A χ ≥s iff A = A n (s, i) for some i ∈ ω.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 28 and 25.
Let ψ(x) be the formula ¬ ∃y (x = p(y)). Then A n (s, i) ψ(t, j) iff j = i.
For s ∈ n <n and k < n, let χ s,k be the following sentence: ∃x ϕ s (p n−k (x)) ∧ ψ(x) ∧ χ ≥s .
Lemma 30. For every submodel A of A n and every k < n, we have A χ s,k iff A = A n (s, i) for some i such that i ≡ n k. ) and B = A n (s, j) for some s ∈ n <n and i, j < ω such that i ≡ n j. From Lemma 25 we conclude that (Sub(A n ), ⊒) is isomorphic to (X n , ). Now it follows that (Sub(A n ) ≡ , ⊒ ≡ ) is isomorphic to Q n , as required.
For the case when Ω has constant symbols, we add a new element c to X n and define the model A ′ n on the set X n ∪ {c}. We extend the above defined operation · by letting c · x = x · c = c for all x; all constant symbols in Ω are interpreted by c. The same arguments as above prove that (Sub(A ′ n ) ≡ , ⊒ ≡ ) is isomorphic to Q ′ n . The proof of Theorem 24 is finished.
Now the completeness result follows:
Theorem 32. Let Ω contain a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2 (and, possibly, other symbols), and let C be the class of all models in Ω. Then
if Ω has no constant symbols, S4.2.1 otherwise.
Proof. We have soundness by Theorem 22. For the converse, we apply Lemma 21, then Theorem 24 and Proposition 14, and then Proposition 23.
Moreover, the calculated modal theories are robust.
Corollary 33. Let Ω contain a functional symbol of arity ≥ 2 (and, possibly, other symbols), and let C be the class of all models in Ω. Suppose that K is any language such that K includes L and the ⊒-satisfiability is expressible in K on C. Then
Proof. By Theorems 32 and 22, and Proposition 15.
The cases of other signatures will be considered in the subsequent parts of this work.
